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The fact that twice as many children now live below the poverty line 
than did in 1984 has become New Zealand’s most shameful statistic.1 
Eleanor Ainge Roy, The Guardian, August 16, 2016 
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1 Eleanor Ainge Roy, New Zealand’s Most Shameful Secret: ‘We Have Normalised 
Child Poverty,’ THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016 
/aug/16/new-zealands-most-shameful-secret-we-have-normalised-child-poverty. 
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The purpose of this Act is to help achieve a significant and sustained 
reduction in child poverty in New Zealand by provisions that . . . 
facilitate political accountability against published targets.2 
Child Poverty Reduction Act 2018, s 3 (N.Z.) 
INTRODUCTION 
t is an unfortunate truth that poverty does not discriminate. Although 
absolute poverty principally afflicts low-income countries, relative 
poverty is a universal issue. New Zealand, a small but powerful country 
in the South Pacific, knows relative poverty’s truth all too well. Despite 
its status as a liberal democracy with a strong gross domestic product 
and membership in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), New Zealand harbors an alarming statistic: 
almost one-quarter of its children live in relative poverty.3 Academics 
and politicians alike have considered child poverty a “growing 
concern”4 since the 1980s, when New Zealand experienced a 
“substantial and dramatic increase in income inequality.”5 However, 
even as New Zealand’s child poverty rates approached 25%, for many 
years the appetite to address the problem was nonexistent.6 It appears 
previous successive governments thought the problem was simply 
insurmountable.7 Such an argument is not without merit, as there is no 
straightforward solution to alleviating poverty. Absent international 
intervention and aid, a domestic government must embrace one of two 
options for creating the change required to elevate its citizens out of 
poverty: introducing a legislative agenda or implementing a social 
2 Child Poverty Reduction Act 2018, S 3 (N.Z.). 
3 See Michael Fletcher, New Zealand’s Dismal Record on Child Poverty and the 
Government’s Challenge to Turn It Around, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 26, 2019), https:// 
theconversation.com/new-zealands-dismal-record-on-child-poverty-and-the-governments 
-challenge-to-turn-it-around-115366 [https://perma.cc/6TQB-LY7C], referencing Child
Poverty Statistics Released, STATS NZ (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.stats.govt.nz
/news/child-poverty-statistics-released [https://perma.cc/XK8S-LKPC].
4 STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND, MEASURING CHILD POVERTY IN NEW ZEALAND: ISSUES 
AND PRACTICALITIES 22 (2012), https://www.occ.org.nz/assets/Uploads/EAG/Working 
-papers/Statistics-NZ-Measuring-Child-Poverty-final.pdf.
5 MICHAEL O’BRIEN, POVERTY, POLICY AND THE STATE: THE CHANGING FACE OF
SOCIAL SECURITY 4 (2008).
6 See Renee Liang, A Kete Half Empty: Why Poverty in New Zealand Is Everyone’s
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welfare policy. More importantly, the government must then hold itself 
accountable for achieving that change. 
In 2018, New Zealand chose the former option and introduced the 
Child Poverty Reduction Act 2018 (the Act), which was heralded at 
its inception as a definitive step in the right direction toward easing 
child poverty.8 However, the once-praised Act has failed thus far, as 
the number of children in poverty has increased since the introduction 
of the Act.9 This is thought to be because the Act is ineffective, as it 
lacks proper accountability mechanisms. Although legislators swore it 
imposed political accountability, the Act was entirely silent on any 
consequences that would be levied in the event the government failed 
to reduce child poverty numbers as promised.10 New Zealand has, 
therefore, made itself a case study for analyzing whether effective and 
tangible political accountability is the determinative factor of success 
in any domestic government program to ease poverty.  
In order to examine this thesis, this Article is organized into four 
parts. Part I provides background on poverty, including the definition 
of poverty, an analysis of the history of social and economic policy in 
New Zealand that resulted in the emergence of high levels of relative 
poverty among New Zealand children, and a brief examination of how 
New Zealand has previously engaged in attempts to address the issue. 
Part II introduces the government’s historical Child Poverty Reduction 
8 See, e.g., The Salvation Army, The Salvation Army New Zealand Fiji and Tonga 
Territory Oral Submission, N.Z. PARLIAMENT (May 23, 2018), https://www.parliament.nz 
/resource/en-NZ/52SCSS_EVI_76267_1312/169a2197c75654ebc28c94236a73df73c78bd4a5 
[https://perma.cc/A8PH-TELG]; National Council of Women of New Zealand, Submission 
to the Social Services and Community Committee on the Child Poverty Reductions Bill, 
N.Z. PARLIAMENT (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-NZ/52SCSS 
_EVI_76267_751/79c2c2bfc7c6c4b3e17376a49dd86706b875d764 [https://perma.cc/UP2Y 
-LQR7]; New Zealand Human Rights Commission, Submission on the Child Poverty
Reduction Bill, N.Z. PARLIAMENT, https://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-NZ/52SCSS
_EVI_76267_1027/eebb52e8c8fc5715eaf74ba7579daf63e59d681f [https://perma.cc/2T2Q
-PCNS]; Child Poverty Action Group, Submission on the Child Poverty Reduction Bill and
Changes to the Vulnerable Children Act 2014, N.Z. PARLIAMENT (Mar., 2018),
https://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-NZ/52SCSS_EVI_76267_789/db4fb04b21fd2b464
21e10fcbfaab213979b3fe7 [https://perma.cc/MVL4-JAH6].
9 Jenée Tibshraeny, New Stats NZ Data Shows Little Change to Child Poverty Measures 
in Recent Years, with 151,700 Children Living in Material Hardship, INTEREST.CO.NZ 




10 See Child Poverty Reduction Act 2018 (N.Z.).
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Act 2018. The Act is contextualized with reference to the current 
progressive government, led by Jacinda Ardern, before the purpose and 
language of the Act are examined with particular attention paid to the 
inclusion of any accountability mechanisms and how they would be 
realized in practice. Building on Part II’s analysis, Part III analyzes 
political accountability generally, and notably, the role it plays in 
effectively implementing substantial social policy change and the 
intrinsic need for some form of sanctions to be in place in order to 
see true accountability realized. By way of example, this Part also 
considers New Zealand’s own recently failed social housing policy—
KiwiBuild. Finally, as no critique is complete without presenting a 
viable alternative, Part IV introduces and considers Brazil’s Bolsa 
Família program. This successful program, introduced over fifteen 
years ago, initially courted intense skepticism, as it involves a 
government providing direct cash transfers to vulnerable families. This 
Article also examines whether it was the nature of the program (i.e., a 
direct social welfare policy as opposed to a goal-setting legislative 
agenda) that resulted in its success or whether it was because the 
Brazilian government was truly accountable to its people in 
accomplishing the program’s goals. 
This Article concludes by determining how important political 
accountability is to domestic governments when they attempt to reduce 
poverty. Specifically, this Article concludes by examining whether 
such accountability can be codified and self-imposed by a government, 
and ultimately, whether New Zealand could have done more to realize 
its goal of reducing child poverty nationwide. 
I 
BACKGROUND 
A. The Difficulty with Defining Poverty
Although poverty is a widely recognized and widely used term, 
poverty is a difficult concept to define. “Absolute poverty” is said to be 
“a condition characterized by severe deprivation of basic human needs, 
including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, 
education and information.”11 However, “absolute poverty” is not the 
same as “relative poverty,” which is based on disparity in income12 and 
11 O’BRIEN, supra note 5, at 44. 
12 See OECD, EQUITY INDICATORS, SOCIETY AT A GLANCE 2005: OECD SOCIAL 
INDICATORS 53 (2005). 
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most notably afflicts the child population of New Zealand.13 There is a 
general consensus that an income level set to 60% of median household 
disposable income after housing costs is a reasonable level of income 
to protect people from the worst effects of poverty;14 therefore, anyone 
sitting below this level of income after housing costs lives in relative 
poverty. In accordance with this definition, New Zealand self-reports 
that almost one-quarter of all children in the country live in relative 
poverty.15  
Even if relative poverty is not equivalent to absolute poverty, which 
can be defined by reference to a specific income level,16 the true “cost” 
of relative poverty is no less important than the cost of absolute 
poverty. As one New Zealand academic writes, “The costs of income 
inequality are clear: they are measured in the diseased lungs of 
children, in the lives wasted behind bars, in the stress and despair 
of those battling mental illness, and even in the gated communities 
sheltering the rich.”17 Even more concerning is that the effects of 
poverty are cumulative, and the “1 in 4 children” statistic has been 
around for almost thirty years.18 New Zealand’s statistics in this area 
have also garnered international attention. The OECD’s 2005 “Society 
at a Glance” report singled out New Zealand’s poor statistics on child 
poverty and noted that, while countries with higher poverty rates for 
the entire population generally do have a higher poverty rate among 
children, “the difference between the two is especially large in New 
Zealand, the United States and the United Kingdom.”19 As a high-
13 See David Haigh, Poverty in New Zealand, 4 WHANAKE: PAC. J. CMTY. DEV. 102, 
103–04 (2018). 
14 Facts About Poverty in New Zealand, N.Z. COUNCIL OF CHRISTIAN SOC. SERV. (Apr. 
25, 2020, 4:48 PM), https://nzccss.org.nz/work/poverty/facts-about-poverty/ [https://perma 
.cc/TM4Y-23Q6]. 
15 BRYCE WILKINSON & JENESA JERAM, POORLY UNDERSTOOD: THE STATE OF 
POVERTY IN NEW ZEALAND, 11 (2016). 
16 Absolute or “extreme” poverty has been defined by the World Bank as a person living 
on less than US $1.90 a day. See WORLD BANK, POVERTY AND SHARED PROSPERITY 2018: 
PIECING TOGETHER THE POVERTY PUZZLE 1 (2018). See also Amy Frykholm, Ending 
Extreme Poverty: Economist Ana Revenga, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY (June 2, 2016), 
https://www.christiancentury.org/article/2016-05/ending-extreme-poverty [https://perma.cc 
/JV6P-RMEE]. 
17 INEQUALITY: A NEW ZEALAND CRISIS 167 (Max Rashbrooke ed., 2013). 
18 Susan St John & Jeni Cartwright, Get Our Children Out of Poverty, 237 TUI MOTU 
MAG. 10 (2019). 
19 OECD, supra note 12, at 56. 
90 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 22, 85 
income democratic country, how did New Zealand reach these 
incriminating numbers? The answer lies in its unique colonial history. 
B. A Historical Analysis of Poverty in New Zealand
By global standards, New Zealand is a relatively young country. 
Although the indigenous Māori population has been present in the 
country since the early fourteenth century,20 New Zealand was 
colonized by England and entered a new age as a Western democracy 
in 1840,21 before gaining statutory independence in 1947.22 Initially, 
New Zealand’s economic and social policies were nothing short of 
egalitarian by world standards and, after landmark social welfare 
reforms by the government in the early twentieth century, the country 
“was said to be leading the world in creating a ‘modern, inclusivist 
liberal democracy.’”23 New Zealand also prospered by being insulated 
from the rest of the world and engaging in a successful produce export 
trade with Britain.24 However, one historian characterized New 
Zealand’s boastful, early, low levels of poverty as having “an element 
of mythology,”25 not least of all because, even from the outset, some of 
the “equal” wealth division among New Zealanders was at the expense 
of the Māori population through “land grabs.”26  
Regardless, the achievement of normalized economic equality did 
not last. In the 1970s, New Zealand’s economy began to lag, as 
globalization made New Zealand’s insular economy a thing of the past, 
and the effects of international oil shortages and high inflation took 
20 Richard Walters et al., Mass Migration and the Polynesian Settlement of New Zealand, 
30(4) J. WORLD PREHISTORY 351, 360 (2017). 
21 Ministry for Culture and Heritage, Crown Colony Era, HISTORY OF THE GOVERNOR-
GEN., https://nzhistory.govt.nz/politics/history-of-the-governor-general/crown-colony-era 
(last updated July 14, 2014). 
22 John Wilson, Nation and Government, TE ARA – THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF N.Z., https:// 
teara.govt.nz/en/nation-and-government/page-2 [https://perma.cc/SCM5-2GHK] (last updated 
Sep. 16, 2016). 
23 INEQUALITY: A NEW ZEALAND CRISIS, supra note 17, at 25. 
24 Id. at 27. Tim Shoebridge & Gavin McLean, Feeding Britain, MINISTRY FOR 
CULTURE AND HERITAGE (May 4, 2016), https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/public-service-at 
-war/feeding-britain [https://perma.cc/4WB2-RHLJ].
25 O’BRIEN, supra note 5, at 4.
26 This and other discrimination against the Māori population caused economic harms
that echoed into the twenty-first century. See INEQUALITY: A NEW ZEALAND CRISIS, supra
note 17, at 25.
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their toll.27 Concurrently, unemployment began to rise,28 and the 1980s 
and 1990s were a time of notably low wage growth.29 Although New 
Zealand had pioneered the establishment of a comprehensive welfare 
state by providing generous social assistance for all families with 
children,30 in an example of poor planning, New Zealand dismantled 
its robust welfare system at the same time that unemployment began to 
grow.31 Significant poverty eventuated,32 which had a disproportionate 
effect on both children and marginalized groups, such as the Māori and 
Pacific Islanders.33  
The collapse of income equality and a healthy welfare system across 
the last two decades of the twentieth century, and the extremes of 
poverty (and especially, child poverty) that eventuated, are problems 
that successive New Zealand governments have grappled with but have 
been unable or unwilling to resolve. While in 2018 former Prime 
Minister Bill English touted his party’s record on child poverty,34 
when he previously served as Finance Minister he stated that he was 
“comfortable” with the level of income inequality in New Zealand and 
raised doubts about whether the government could even combat 
the high levels of entrenched poverty, suggesting it did not “have the 
levers.”35 Irrespective of the excuses for relative inaction by 
governments, the extremes of wealth and poverty and the issue of child 
poverty have festered to the point where the proportion of children 
living in deepest poverty has not decreased over the past ten years.36  
27 See id. at 26. 
28 BRAD PATTERSON & KATHRYN PATTERSON, NEW ZEALAND: WORLD 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SERIES, VOLUME 18, at liii (1998). 
29 Emma Davies et al., Preventing Child Poverty: Barriers and Solutions, 39(2) N.Z. J. 
PSYCH. 20, 21 (2010). 
30 JONATHON BOSTON & SIMON CHAPPLE, CHILD POVERTY IN NEW ZEALAND, at viii 
(2014). 
31 ANGELINE BARRETTA-HERMAN, WELFARE STATE TO WELFARE SOCIETY: 
RESTRUCTURING NEW ZEALAND’S SOCIAL SERVICES, at xvi (1994). 
32 BOSTON & CHAPPLE, supra note 30, at viii. 
33 ANDREW BECROFT ET AL., THE BIG QUESTIONS: WHAT IS NEW ZEALAND’S FUTURE? 
113 (2018). 
34 Govt Poverty Target ‘Makes No Sense’ - Bill English, NEWSHUB (Jan. 30, 2018), 
https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2018/01/govt-poverty-target-makes-no-sense-bill 
-english.html [https://perma.cc/V7TP-PLYN].
35 INEQUALITY: A NEW ZEALAND CRISIS, supra note 17, at 34.
36 RONJI TANIELU ET AL., STATE OF THE NATION REPORT 2020, THE SALVATION ARMY 
8 (2020). See also INEQUALITY: A NEW ZEALAND CRISIS, supra note 17, at 25. 
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C. Addressing Poverty in New Zealand
Now that the prevalence of child poverty in New Zealand has been 
established, this Article next examines New Zealand’s attempts to 
address this problem. The government, nonprofits, social workers, and 
think tanks have proposed various strategies and policies over the 
years, from “a more comprehensive and effective indexation regime 
[for social assistance]”37 to simply increasing welfare assistance.38 
Hypothetical strategies materialized into actions when Jacinda Ardern 
took power as Prime Minister of the country in 2017.39 One of Ardern’s 
election platforms was the promise to alleviate child poverty40 
and, once in office, Ardern personally appointed herself Minister for 
Child Poverty Reduction. New Zealand also committed to the United 
Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal target of reducing all 
indicators of income poverty by 50% by 2030.41 Perhaps due to 
numerous, pressing issues that have plagued the later stages of Ardern’s 
first term in power,42 the goal of reducing child poverty has been 
somewhat neglected, and certainly has not been addressed in the 
meaningful ways the Prime Minister probably envisioned. As recently 
as February of this year, two and a half years into the Prime Minister’s 
three-year term, the Salvation Army declared in its “State of the 
Nation” report that it does not see the change required to deal with 
“normalized, entrenched inequality and poverty in New Zealand.”43 
37 Jonathon Boston, Redesigning the Welfare State: Rethinking the Indexation of Cash 
and Non-cash Assistance, 15(1) POVERTY Q. 1, 4 (2019). 
38 Charlotte Graham-McLay, Poverty ‘Entrenched’ in New Zealand Despite Progress 
on Social Issues - Report, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com 
/world/2020/feb/12/poverty-entrenched-in-new-zealand-despite-progress-on-social-issues 
-report [https://perma.cc/CX3F-GQ5H].
39 Jacinda Ardern’s Labour Party promised that, if elected, they would lift 100,000
children out of poverty. See Labour Would Lift 100,000 Children Out of Poverty by 2020 -
Ardern, RNZ (Sept. 5, 2017, 1:22 PM), https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/338701/labour
-would-lift-100-000-children-out-of-poverty-by-2020-ardern [https://perma.cc/3TDW 
-KXX5].
40 Freedom in the World 2018: New Zealand, FREEDOM HOUSE (Apr. 26, 2020, 11:31
AM), https://freedomhouse.org/country/new-zealand/freedom-world/2018 [https://perma
.cc/74KD-RAA9].
41 MAVIS DUNCANSON ET AL., CHILD POVERTY MONITOR: TECHNICAL REPORT 2017,
at 3 (2017).
42 Such issues include a terrorist attack on a Christchurch mosque, the eruption of a live
volcano resulting in loss of life from a tourist boat expedition, and the COVID-19 pandemic.
43 TANIELU ET AL., supra note 36, at 3. 
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Nonetheless, the government did take one notable step to directly 
address child poverty: it introduced the Child Poverty Reduction Act 
2018. The Act was commended by commentators and academics alike, 
and received near universal support when it passed Parliament.44 
Before any critique is proffered, it is important to consider the contents 
and language of the Act itself. 
II 
THE CHILD POVERTY REDUCTION ACT 
A. History and Language of the Act
The bill for the Child Poverty Reduction Act was first introduced 
into Parliament on January 31, 2018.45 It was the product of a long 
public consultation and inquiry period, in which numerous nonprofit 
organizations, charities, and religious institutions sent in submissions 
outlining the issues they faced and what they believed the bill needed 
to address in order to achieve change.46 A committee then determined 
the best language for the bill.47 When outlining the contents of the bill 
in Parliament, Prime Minister Ardern stated that “the essence of this 
bill is to build enduring political accountability, consensus, and action 
on reducing child poverty. It provides a framework for measuring and 
targeting child poverty, and it creates a commitment to action on the 
part of the Government to address the well-being of all [children].”48 
The bill passed through Parliament and received royal assent on 
December 20, 2018.49 The introduction of the Act was met with 
apprehensive but genuine support from local organizations and 
nongovernmental organizations.50 
44 (18 December 2018) 735 NZPD 9035–58. 
45 Id. at 21.  
46 For the Child Poverty Reduction Act’s complete submissions and advice history, 
see Child Poverty Reduction Bill, N.Z. PARLIAMENT (Dec. 7, 2020, 8:46 PM), https:// 
www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/BILL_76267/tab 
/submissionsandadvice. 
47 (27 November 2018) 735 NZPD 8252–68. 
48 (31 October 2018) 734 NZPD 7885. 
49 Child Poverty Reduction Bill, N.Z. PARLIAMENT (Apr. 26, 2020, 10:18 AM), https:// 
www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/BILL_76267 
/child-poverty-reduction-bill. 
50 After describing the troubling level of child poverty in the country, an article in New 
Zealand Social Work explains that the “Child Poverty Reduction Bill” (as it was then titled) 
“may yet reduce poverty-related demand [for social services].” See Emily Keddell, Harm, 
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The Act is structured almost like a checklist: it sets out the various 
obligations placed upon the New Zealand government to account for 
child poverty. The Act also outlines agreed-upon child poverty 
indicators51 before introducing target setting, requiring reports be 
furnished, and stipulating child poverty be considered in the annual 
national budget.52 These are the alleged accountability tools that reflect 
Ardern’s promise to create a commitment to action on the part of the 
Government through a system largely concerning self-reporting on 
self-defined targets.53 Officially, the Act primarily requires the 
government undertake three tasks: to report annually on a set of 
measures of child poverty,54 set three-year and ten-year targets for each 
of the four defined primary measures of poverty, and report their 
progress to Parliament.55 The government immediately released its 
three-year and ten-year targets, which were as follows: 
Three year intermediate targets: 
• low income households on the before housing costs primary
measure from 16 percent of children to 10 percent—a
reduction of around 70,000 children.
• low income households on the after housing costs primary
measure from 23 percent of children to 19 percent—
a reduction of around 40,000 children.
Care and Babies: An Inequalities and Policy Discourse Perspective on Recent Child 
Protection Trends in Aotearoa New Zealand, 31 AOTEAROA N.Z. SOC. WORK, no. 4, 2019, 
at 18, 32. 
51 The poverty indicators are as follows: low income before housing costs (below 50% 
of median income, moving line); low income after housing costs (below 50% of median 
income, fixed line); a measure of material hardship (reflecting the proportion of children 
living in households with hardship rates below a standard threshold); and a measure of 
poverty persistence (currently being developed, reflecting the proportion of children living 
in households experiencing poverty over several years, based on at least one of the measures 
above). 
52 Child Poverty Reduction Act 2018, s 30 (N.Z.). See also Phil Mercer, How New 
Zealand Is Trying to Take on Child Poverty, BBC NEWS (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.bbc 
.com/news/world-asia-45819681 [https://perma.cc/4AGK-4MXT]. 
53 See supra text accompanying note 39.  
54 Child Poverty Reduction Act 2018, s 30 (N.Z.). 
55 Child Poverty Reduction Act 2018, s 21 (N.Z.). See also Michael Fletcher, 
New Zealand’s Dismal Record on Child Poverty, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 26, 2019, 
9:13 PM), https://theconversation.com/new-zealands-dismal-record-on-child-poverty-and 
-the-governments-challenge-to-turn-it-around-115366 [https://perma.cc/BD9N-3V8R].
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• material hardship from 13 percent to 10 percent—
a reduction of around 30,000 children.56
Ten year longer term targets: 
• low income households on the before housing costs primary
measure from 16 percent of children to 5 percent—a
reduction of around 120,000 children.
• low income households on the after housing costs primary
measure from 23 percent of children to 10 percent—a
reduction of around 130,000 children.
• material hardship from 13 percent of children to 6 percent—
a reduction of around 80,000 children.57
B. The Promise of Greatness and the Failure to Realize It
Jacinda Ardern herself noted that the Act was intended to be an 
instrument for change and not necessarily the change itself, stating “the 
bill in and of itself does not contain the measures that reduce child 
poverty,” but instead the Bill creates “the impetus, the transparency, 
and the accountability mechanisms to make sure that successive 
Governments put this issue at the heart of their policy making . . . it’s 
a piece of infrastructure.”58 Additionally, the government’s primer for 
the legislation states the purpose of the Act is to “encourage a 
Government focus on child poverty reduction.”59 At face value, the Act 
still appears to be a sound instrument for effecting change through 
heightened scrutiny of government activity. However, as one academic 
notes, “by any standards, this child poverty reduction target is 
ambitious. In order to achieve it, the incomes of the country’s poorest 
families will need to be raised to median disposable household 
incomes.”60  
56 Child Poverty Measures, Targets and Indicators, DEP’T OF PRIME MINISTER AND 
CABINET, (Mar. 26, 2020), https://dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/reducing-child-poverty 
/child-poverty-measures-targets-and-indicators [https://perma.cc/6M7R-SJ97]. 
57 Id. 
58 (27 November 2018) 735 NZPD 8252. 
59 Child Poverty Reduction and Wellbeing Legislation, DEP’T OF THE PRIME MINISTER 
& CABINET (emphasis added), https://dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/reducing-child-poverty 
/child-poverty-reduction-and-wellbeing-legislation (Mar. 26, 2020). 
60 Boston, supra note 37, at 6. See also Michael Fletcher, Towards Wellbeing? 
Developments in Social Legislation and Policy in New Zealand, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR 
SOC. L. & SOC. POL’Y: SOC. L. REPORTS 02/2019 9 (2019). 
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Although the Act was supposed to be a tool to encourage change, 
seemingly no politician or executive officer was sufficiently 
encouraged to meet the government’s ambitious targets because two 
and a half years later, New Zealand’s child poverty numbers “haven’t 
budged.”61 A Guardian headline in December 2019 used even plainer 
language to frame the disappointment: “Ardern government fails to 
reduce child poverty in New Zealand.”62 The three-year and ten-year 
nature of the goal-setting aspect of the Act will inevitably induce the 
response that the government simply needs more time to realize its 
ambitious targets, but as the deadline for the 2021 goal approaches, it 
is not just a case of the child poverty numbers stagnating: they have 
gotten worse.63 Therefore, a strong argument exists that Ardern’s 
treasured experimental piece of legislation simply does not work. 
Overly ambitious targets aside, the true foil of the government’s novel 
legislative agenda is that its efficacy relies on the government’s 
branches, be they legislative or executive, adhering to the reporting 
requirements and meeting their ambitious goals. But should these 
government branches fail (and it appears that, at least in the short term, 
they will fail), what are the consequences? Such a question logically 
leads to the next: if there are no real consequences, then what was the 
point of introducing this ambitious Act in the first place?  
This is, of course, not the first time a democratic government has 
made a promise it failed to keep. In fact, this is not even the first time 
the Ardern government has been unsuccessful in adhering to its own 
targets. One of the Ardern government’s other signature policies was 
KiwiBuild, the plan to construct 100,000 affordable houses within the 
61 DEP’T OF THE PRIME MINISTER & CABINET, supra note 56; Belinda Luscombe, A 
Year After Christchurch, Jacinda Ardern Has the World’s Attention. How Will She Use It?, 
TIME (Feb. 20, 2020, 6:47 AM), https://time.com/5787443/jacinda-ardern-christchurch-new 
-zealand-anniversary/ [https://perma.cc/J8XJ-LPNG].
62 Eleanor Ainge Roy, Ardern Government Fails to Reduce Child Poverty in New
Zealand, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2019, 9:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019
/dec/09/ardern-government-fails-to-reduce-child-poverty-in-new-zealand [https://perma.cc
/D6YM-EGEM].
63 Statistical data show that, in the first financial year following the introduction of the
Child Poverty Reduction Act, the rate of low-income families declined, but not to a level
that was statistically significant. Material hardship levels remained the same, and rates of
hardship for Māori and Pacific people are higher. See Child Poverty Statistics: Year Ended
June 2019, STATS NZ (Feb. 24, 2020, 1:45 PM), https://www.stats.govt.nz/information
-releases/child-poverty-statistics-year-ended-june-2019 [https://perma.cc/SZX4-HM34].
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decade.64 Launched in July 2018, only forty-seven homes were built 
within the first six months, causing the government to retract its 
ambitious policy.65 While amending the KiwiBuild scheme, Housing 
Minister Megan Woods stated it was “overly ambitious” and said that 
when policies do not work the government was “honest about that and 
[would] fix them.”66 The difference, therefore, between KiwiBuild and, 
one could say, the equivalent failure of the targets set by the Act, was 
the government’s acknowledgment of KiwiBuild’s failure and the 
consequences for those involved: the head of the KiwiBuild program 
resigned six months into the role,67 and the Prime Minister stripped the 
then Housing and Urban Development Minister, Phil Twyford, of his 
cabinet portfolio.68 Meanwhile, the Child Poverty Reduction Act 2018, 
a piece of legislation heralded as the bedrock of political accountability 
in the area of child poverty reduction, is silent on what consequences 
the government faces should it fail to deliver.  
Consequently, the expected inability to meet any of the three-year 
intermediate targets set under the Act is not the real issue. Rather, the 
Act’s silence regarding consequences the government faces should it 
fail to deliver is the issue. While it may be difficult to codify self-
accountability, the New Zealand government, in openly claiming the 
Act’s use as a tool of political accountability, has found itself with yet 
another empty promise. The Act will therefore become a case study to 
64 Ben McKay, ‘We Are Changing It’: New Zealand Backflips on 100,000 Affordable 
Home Pledge, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 4, 2019, 1:26 PM), https://www.smh 
.com.au/world/oceania/we-are-changing-it-new-zealand-backflips-on-100-000-affordable 
-home-pledge-20190904-p52nw1.html [https://perma.cc/MAG9-9EZ3].
65 Eleanor Ainge Roy, New Zealand Housing Crisis: Just 47 ‘Affordable’ Homes Built
in Six Months, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2019, 10:00 PM), https://www.theguardian
.com/world/2019/jan/28/new-zealand-housing-crisis-just-47-affordable-homes-built-in-six
-months [https://perma.cc/TK9Q-YQGM]. See also AAP, Ardern Scraps 100,000
Affordable Homes Plan, THE AUSTRALIAN (Sept. 4, 2019, 10:34 PM), https://www
.theaustralian.com.au/world/ardern-scraps-100000-affordable-homes-plan/news-story/c2f4
4766184ab9cee8f4417c16605f35.
66 Jason Walls, KiwiBuild Reset: Government Axes Its 100,000 Homes over 10 Years 
Target, N.Z. HERALD (Sept. 4, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article 
.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12264757 [https://perma.cc/KR6X-KJQC]. 
67 Zane Small, Labour’s Flagship Policy: Where Did KiwiBuild Go Wrong?, NEWSHUB 
(Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2019/09/labour-s-flagship 
-policy-where-did-kiwibuild-go-wrong.html [https://perma.cc/Y3S2-WCLW].
68 Henry Cook, PM Takes Housing Off Phil Twyford in First Major Reshuffle, STUFF
(June 27, 2019, 3:50 PM), https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/113821469/pm-takes
-housing-off-phil-twyford-in-first-major-reshuffle [https://perma.cc/4Z62-X6CG].
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examine the role of government accountability in improving poverty 
levels generally. To highlight the importance of practical political 
accountability and its application by domestic governments, examining 
government accountability and the critical role consequences play in 
attaining effective accountability remains important.  
III 
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EFFECTING CHANGE 
The successful realization of accountability is an issue that plagues 
poverty-alleviating programs. The World Bank has often reported on 
the significance of accountability and analyzed a range of mechanisms 
that can be used to achieve optimal accountability.69 This is particularly 
important when governments manage public money, as a government 
must be transparent both because the public has a right to information 
and because the risk of corruption is endemic. The New Zealand 
government certainly acknowledged the importance of accountability 
throughout the stages of crafting and finalizing the Act. During a 
committee hearing regarding the proposed Child Poverty Reduction 
Bill, Prime Minister Ardern stated that the Bill “facilitates” political 
accountability.70 Later, when introducing the Bill to parliament, she 
made a similar pitch, saying the “essence” of the Bill was, among other 
things, to “[build] enduring political accountability.”71 Priyanca 
Radhakrishnan, the Parliamentary Private Secretary for Ethnic Affairs, 
echoed this sentiment, claiming that “at the heart of this bill . . . is 
political accountability.”72 Even the Act itself refers to the concept in 
Section 3, titled “Purpose of the Act:”  
The purpose of this Act is to help achieve a significant and sustained 
reduction in child poverty in New Zealand by provisions that— 
(a) encourage a focus by government and society on child poverty
reduction:
69 E.g., Stefano Migliorisi & Clay Wescott, A Review of World Bank Support for 
Accountability Institutions in the Context of Governance and Anticorruption (Indep. 
Evaluation Grp., Working Paper No. 5, 2011).  
70 (27 November 2018) 735 NZPD 8252. 
71 (31 October 2018) 734 NZPD 7885. 
72 (31 October 2018) 734 NZPD 7890. 
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(b) facilitate political accountability against published targets:
(c) require transparent reporting on levels of child poverty.73
Therefore, it is clear the New Zealand government would agree 
with the World Bank about the importance of accountability. The 
importance of accountability and the need for governments to 
implement it, however, does not mean accountability is not “an 
elusive concept”74 that is difficult to define and contextualize. 
According to the Cambridge Dictionary, accountability is “the fact 
of being responsible for what you do and [being] able to give 
a satisfactory reason for it, or the degree to which this happens.”75 In 
terms of practical accountability, this is having “to answer for one’s 
action or inaction, and depending on the answer, to be exposed to 
potential sanctions, both positive and negative.”76 Similarly, the 
World Bank states that accountability means “the obligation to give 
an account of one’s action to particular individuals, groups, or 
organizations.”77 In terms of political accountability, this is said to 
be the accountability of governments. Specifically, representative 
democracies are “accountable” if their citizens can discern 
representative from unrepresentative governments and can sanction 
unrepresentative governments appropriately.78 The World Bank has 
notably commented that political accountability is a citizen’s right, but 
it is also a citizen’s duty to demand it.79
73 Child Poverty Reduction Act 2018, s 3 (N.Z.) (emphasis added). See also Child 
Poverty Reduction Bill 2018 (14-2) (Social Services and Community Committee report) at 
1 (N.Z.). 
74 Kerina Wang, How to Make Sense of Government Accountability, WORLD BANK 
BLOGS: GOVERNANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT (Jan. 21, 2015), https://blogs.worldbank.org 
/governance/how-make-sense-government-accountability [https://perma.cc/AV3Y-ZFEY]. 
75 Accountability, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY (2020). 
76 Ronald J. Oakerson, Governance Structures for Enhancing Accountability and 
Responsiveness, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 114, 114 (James L. Perry ed., 
1989). 
77 Wang, supra note 74. 
78 DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPRESENTATION 10 (Adam Przeworski et al. 
eds., 1999). 
79 Idah Pswarayi-Riddihough, World Bank Country Dir. for Sri Lanka & the Maldives, 
Transparency and Public Accountability Is at the Core of Good Corporate Governance, 
(Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2018/04/10/keynote-address 
-transparency-public-accountability-the-core-good-corporate-governance [https://perma.cc
/U4TY-Y7Z7].
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From these various definitions arises a commonality: all satisfactory 
definitions of accountability include, explicitly or implicitly, two 
essential features: information and sanctions.80 The New Zealand 
government has already satisfied the information feature of this test by 
providing their constituents with information on child poverty in the 
form of yearly reports, recognizing the need to ease child poverty in all 
government budgets, and publishing the government’s three-year and 
ten-year goals.81 The missing piece, therefore, is sanctions. If 
government accountability were as simple as threatening sanctions, 
however, then the World Bank would not expend so much time and 
energy on the issue. The problem with sanctions lies in the execution: 
when a government fails to act, who sanctions it and how?  
A. The Need for Sanctions and Issues in Applying Them
The question of how to hold governments to account has a long 
history. Once an issue largely concerning the proper management of 
money, accountability has evolved to the broader concept of good 
governance. In the 1940s, political scientists Carl Friedrich and 
Herman Finer famously engaged in a debate concerning the best 
method of political accountability.82 Finer believed that accountability 
was guaranteed by maintaining external constraints (i.e., the 
government is answerable to oversight commissions or the judiciary), 
whereas Friedrich argued that self-control is possible, provided there is 
an agreed-upon set of internal norms and values.83 Ultimately, 
contemporary discourse reaches a general consensus regarding the 
idea of “answerability” in political accountability, which concludes 
that aspects of both Finer’s and Friedrich’s arguments are true. 
Contemporary discourse’s general consensus states the pre factum 
rules of control by which the government must abide are as important 
as the consequences for the violation of the rules.84  
80 Robert O. Keohane, The Concept of Accountability in World Politics and the Use of 
Force, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1121, 1124 (2003). 
81 Child Poverty Measures, Targets and Indicators, DEP’T OF THE PRIME MINISTER  
& CABINET, https://dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/reducing-child-poverty/child-poverty 
-measures-targets-and-indicators [https://perma.cc/V6ME-ECSS ] (July 2, 2020).
82 Tom Willems & Wouter Van Dooren, Coming to Terms with Accountability, 14 PUB.
MGMT. REV. 1012, 1013 (2012).
83 Id. 
84 Roy Heidelberg, Political Accountability and Spaces of Contestation, 49(10) ADMIN. 
& SOC’Y 1379, 1383 (2017). 
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We now turn to the New Zealand government. The “consequence” 
the New Zealand government undoubtedly had in mind in the instance 
they did not fulfill their promise was the condemnation of their 
constituents, also known as “electoral accountability” or “vertical 
accountability.”85 In democracies such as New Zealand’s, politicians 
are elected based on the determination of their electorates. Since they 
typically seek reelection, or election to a higher office, the potential 
“sanction” of being removed from office is said to be a “powerful 
inducement” for politicians to “explain their actions to electorates and 
serve in their electorates’ interests.”86 Politicians additionally face 
criticism from those who may run in opposition to them, and they are 
held accountable through critical debate and scrutiny in the public 
forum.87 Nevertheless, some recent work suggests that, even in 
democracies, retrospective electoral accountability is not as powerful a 
sanction as conventionally thought. One author writes that 
“contemporary analyses of accountability, both academic and political, 
tend to be rather pessimistic. They generally contend that the central 
idea of ministerial responsibility has eroded and that the once solid 
democratic pyramidal chain of delegation is broken; as a result, 
‘accountability gaps’ and ‘democratic deficits’ are identified.”88 
In the case of the Child Poverty Reduction Act and the New Zealand 
government’s failure to adhere to its self-stipulated goals with 
seemingly little or no consequence, the theory of “accountability gaps” 
and “democratic deficits” holds true. Of course, the voters had the 
opportunity to vote out the Ardern government in the October 2020 
national election, but instead retained the government in a landslide 
victory.89 Retaining the Ardern government, in spite of its failure to 
adhere to its own promise to alleviate child poverty, touches on 
research on corruption and voting that shows that citizens sometimes 
85 John Joseph, Accountability in Governance, THE WORLD BANK (Apr. 27, 2020, 
9:37 PM), https://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE 
/Resources/AccountabilityGovernance.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DGB-7SUE]. 
86 Keohane, supra note 80, at 1131. 
87 Willems & Van Dooren, supra note 82, at 1019. 
88 Id. at 1012. 
89 The election, which was postponed until October 17, 2020, due to COVID-19, was 
won by Prime Minister Ardern’s Labor Party in a “landslide” victory. See New Zealand 
Election: Jacinda Ardern’s Labor Party Scores Landslide Win, BBC News (2020), https:// 
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-54519628 (last visited Dec 7, 2020). 
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fail to punish corrupt regimes through elections.90 While no allegation 
exists that the New Zealand government is in any way corrupt, this 
research echoes the idea of “accountability gaps” and raises the 
question whether a vote every three to five years as the ultimate 
accountability method is an accountability method that will fall short 
of its intended purpose. At the very least, waiting for an election 
removes any sense of immediacy for political accountability.  
Another sanctioning option is accountability through scrutiny by 
Parliamentary opposition parties. Bill English, former Prime Minister 
and member of the opposition, promptly criticized the government 
before the introduction of the Act, saying that the Ardern government’s 
policy of reporting and targets “made no sense,” and that the 
government did not have the means to measure progress. He also 
remarked that the Ardern government should be better held to account 
for “spending our money to change lives.”91 He then promised that the 
National Party would hold the Ardern government accountable if the 
government did not do that itself.92 In addition to playing an important 
role in questioning policies and providing a voice of dissent, Mr. 
English hinted at a valid measure of accountability that the New 
Zealand government has not tried. Ultimately, this measure of 
accountability could have kept the government in check, and 
ultimately, could have helped the Act succeed. This referenced measure 
is horizontal accountability. 
B. Horizontal Accountability
Horizontal accountability consists of “formal relationships within 
the state itself” whereby other state actors have the formal authority to 
investigate branches or sections of the government and demand 
explanations or impose penalties.93 Typical institutions of horizontal 
accountability include legislative committees, oversight agencies, 
ombudsmen, and prosecutors, all of whom demand information, 
question officials, and, possibly, punish improper behavior.94 Such a 
style of accountability “not only embraces internal and external 
90 Anna Lührmann et al., Constraining Governments: New Indices of Vertical, 
Horizontal, and Diagonal Accountability, 114 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 811, 817 (2020). 
91 Govt Poverty Target ‘Makes No Sense’ – Bill English, supra note 34. 
92 Id. 
93 ANNE MARIE GOETZ & ROB JENKINS, REINVENTING ACCOUNTABILITY: MAKING 
DEMOCRACY WORK FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 11 (2005). 
94 See Lührmann et al., supra note 90, at 813. 
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constituencies and mechanisms, but also embraces different functions 
such as monitoring, evaluation, and review.”95 Therefore, given the 
failure of an equally ambitious policy (KiwiBuild) that had a much 
more definitive goal, the New Zealand government should have 
established a Child Poverty Reduction Committee or appointed a 
Child Poverty Reduction Ombudsman as part of the Child Poverty 
Reduction Act. The role of either a Committee or an Ombudsman 
would have been to periodically review the government’s progress, 
question both executive public servants and politicians as to the 
advancement toward the state’s three-year and ten-year goals, and 
ultimately recommend appropriate sanctions for any unsuitable or 
inadequate work to the Prime Minister. 
Even if horizontal accountability mechanisms were implemented, a 
successful marriage of information and sanctions may still not even be 
possible when dealing with the unwieldy beast that is alleviating 
poverty. With goalposts constantly shifting and the demographic and 
population makeup of any one society constantly changing, it is easy 
to see why previous New Zealand governments balked at the idea of 
tackling child poverty. Now New Zealand has a government that 
has tried and fallen at the first hurdle. Is the solution amending the Act 
and stipulating consequences for the government if it fails to meet its 
own targets, such as the redistribution of budget money or extra 
parliamentary sitting days to resolve problems? Or should an entirely 
different approach be taken? 
In order to make an informed suggestion, a different poverty 
reduction method from a different country needs to be examined. In 
this instance, this Article will consider Brazil’s more successful Bolsa 
Família program. 
IV 
BY WAY OF COMPARISON: BRAZIL’S BOLSA FAMÍLIA PROGRAM 
Due to what the World Bank once labelled “non-inclusive growth 
models” and “regressive social policy,” Brazil was plagued by 
inequality for many years.96 In 2003, following years of unprecedented 
95 MEREDITH EDWARDS ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE IN AUSTRALIA 19 
(2012). 
96 Deborah Wetzel & Valor Econômico, Opinion, Bolsa Família: Brazil’s Quiet 
Revolution, THE WORLD BANK (Nov. 4, 2013), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion 
/2013/11/04/bolsa-familia-Brazil-quiet-revolution [https://perma.cc/P3XB-XKXP]. 
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levels of poverty, the Brazilian government introduced a social welfare 
program that few countries would have ever considered: a program 
directly offering a stipend to the poor with few questions asked.97 At its 
inception, the program had many detractors, with concerns ranging 
from whether the money would actually be spent responsibly to 
whether the program would even lift families out of poverty.98 
Interestingly, however, when writing about the poverty problem in 
New Zealand and considering options for change, social welfare 
researcher David Haigh determined that successful overseas strategies 
to reduce child poverty generally involved increased cash transfers to 
families, both working and nonworking.99 Haigh pointed to other 
academics that have noted the best way to ensure that children thrive is 
to provide their families with sufficient income so that they can make 
their own choices.100 The program in Brazil, christened Bolsa Família, 
did just that. 
President Lula introduced the Bolsa Família program and its radical 
but “powerfully simple” concept.101 The concept entrusted the poor 
with cash transfers.102 The concept also conditioned continued receipt 
of cash transfers on recipients keeping their children in school and 
continuing to have their children attend health care visits.103 The 
program was created in October of 2003, following the merger of four 
existing cash transfer programs.104 It was officially incorporated into 
Law No. 10.836 on January 9, 2004, with the proclamation: “the Bolsa 
Família Program is created, within the scope of the Presidency of the 
Republic, for income transfer actions with conditionalities.”105 The law 
contains sanctions for public servants who are in charge of maintaining 
the register of cash transfers who commit an infraction, stipulating 
97 See CHRISTIAN VAN STOLK & SUNIL PATIL, UNDERSTANDING THE FACTORS THAT 
MATTER IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BOLSA FAMÍLIA 1 (2015), https://www.rand.org/pubs 
/research_reports/RR705.html [https://perma.cc/GYK2-99HC]. 
98 See id. 
99 Haigh, supra note 13, at 109. 
100 Id. at 108–09. 
101 Wetzel & Econômico, supra note 96. 
102 Id.  
103 Id.  
104 Kathy Lindert et al., The Nuts and Bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program: 
Implementing Conditional Transfers in a Decentralized Context 6 (The World Bank, 
Working Paper No. 709, May 2007). 
105 Lei No. 10.836, de 9 de Janiero de 2004, Diário Oficial da União (D.O.U.) de 
9.1.2004 (Braz.). 
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violators must repay the embezzled amount and a fine that is “never 
lower than double” but never more than four times the amount 
embezzled.106 Furthermore, any beneficiary under the program who 
provides false information or uses “any other illegal means” to take part 
in the program would be required to reimburse the amount received 
should they wish to remain in the program.107 
The Bolsa Família program was not without its own teething 
problems. During the first two years of the program, there were 
operational issues that caused the government to entirely rethink the 
administration of the program.108 Notably, the government not only 
acknowledged these issues and sought to correct them but it also 
successfully introduced a new program while maintaining the first 
iteration of Bolsa Família until the changeover was complete.109 Thus, 
the government ensured there were no interruptions in the payment of 
benefits for beneficiary families.110 
Although Bolsa Família alone appears to be a monumental 
undertaking, Bolsa Família was only the first step in Brazil’s much 
more substantial plan to eradicate poverty. In 2011, the government 
introduced the “Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan,” which had the 
ambitious goal of moving 16.3 million Brazilians out of poverty.111 
Bolsa Família was integrated as one factor of this plan. In this way, the 
Brazilian government moved in the opposite direction to the New 
Zealand government: Brazil started with a small, clearly defined policy 
and then later combined several already-successful programs into a 
program with an ambitious goal to eradicate poverty, which made their 
ambitious target that much more attainable.112  
In implementing Brazil’s radical program, accountability remained 
key. Although there were fears of corruption, Brazils’ government 
ensured the accountability of the program through two distinct 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 ALINE GAZOLA HELLMANN, HOW DOES BOLSA FAMILIA WORK?: BEST PRACTICES 
IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN LATIN 
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 5 (2015). 
109 Id.  
110 Id. 
111 Romulo Paes-Sousa & Jeni Vaitsman, The Zero Hunger and Brazil Without Extreme 
Poverty Programs: A Step Forward in Brazilian Social Protection Policy, 19 CIENCIA & 
SAUDE COLETIVA 4351, 4352 (2014). 
112 See GAZOLA HELLMANN, supra note 108, at 5–6. 
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mechanisms: complete transparency by the government, including full 
disclosure of all aspects of the welfare program, and external oversight. 
And while neither of these methods of accountability may be 
identically replicated in New Zealand or offer a workable solution for 
New Zealand’s unique piece of child-poverty-fighting legislation, there 
are still lessons to be learned from both. 
First, the Brazilian government sought to ensure its accountability 
through extensive ongoing evaluations of the program. The Inter-
American Development Bank reported that since the program began in 
2004, there have been a total of twenty-three evaluations of the 
program.113 These evaluations were also made publicly available via 
the government’s online Secretariat for Evaluation and Information 
Management (SAGI) portal.114 
Second, and this is the more distinct point of difference between 
Brazil and New Zealand, Brazil did not “go it alone.” The first phase 
of Bolsa Família was supported by a USD $520 million loan from the 
World Bank.115 Later, in 2010, the World Bank approved an additional 
USD $200 million loan for a second iteration of the program.116 Not 
only was this financial aid critical to the success of the program but the 
World Bank’s financial aid also played an incredibly important role in 
the successful delivery of Bolsa Família in a way that New Zealand 
may not be able to replicate: the World Bank acted as a third-party 
auditor of accountability. Before even approving the loan, the World 
Bank conducted an extensive investigation into the program.117 It 
concluded Brazil would need to establish “a solid monitoring and 
evaluation system” that should include formal information mechanisms 
“such as surveys and audits” and “citizen oversight mechanisms.”118 As 
the World Bank stated in documentation confirming the loan, a whole 
113 Id. at 35. 
114 Id. 
115 THE WORLD BANK, REP. NO. AC720, BRAZIL – BOLSA FAMÍLIA PROJECT (ENGLISH) 
(2004), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/663251468235464044/Brazil-Bolsa 
-Familia-Project [https://perma.cc/A5K7-UGZX].
116 THE WORLD BANK, REP NO. 92408, LIFTING FAMILIES OUT OF POVERTY IN BRAZIL:
BOLSA FAMÍLIA PROGRAM (ENGLISH) (2005), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en
/253131468237869685/Lifting-families-out-of-poverty-in-Brazil-Bolsa-Familia-Program
[https://perma.cc/8KSM-RZM7].
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component of the loaned amount (USD $6.7 million) would be put 
toward a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system for the program.119 
The M&E system would consist of several aspects including the 
development of mechanisms to monitor the program and provide 
feedback on both the quality of service delivery and to detect problems. 
The M&E system included three, relevant mechanisms:   
a) inter-government processes;
b) annual quality control reviews (including verification of
health and education conditionalities, the selection of
beneficiaries, and payments); and
c) support for citizen oversight (“social control”).120
These nuanced mechanisms of horizontal government 
accountability were absent from New Zealand’s Act. Such mechanisms 
do not require external oversight by a third party. Rather, these 
mechanisms require a government that is aware of its own limitations 
and is willing to submit to scrutiny from specialist committees to 
achieve compliance with its tasks and ultimately achieve its goals.  
In summary, using New Zealand as a case study in this area reflects 
that accountability cannot just be assumed from annual reporting; it 
must be spelled out and constantly evaluated. Likewise, accountability 
is not achieved just through the publication of targeted goals; it is 
achieved through constant transparency and evaluations, citizen input, 
and internal and external reviews.  
There are many reasons why New Zealand’s Child Poverty 
Reduction Act has been unsuccessful. However, when it comes to 
implementing a welfare policy such as the alleviation of child poverty, 
a government cannot codify its own accountability, cross its fingers, 
and hope for the best. Absent the presence of a well-organized, 
international third party monitoring the government’s success, it was 
incumbent upon the New Zealand government to outsource its own 
accountability. Moreover, the New Zealand government should have 
realized that without rigorous, ongoing, and independent evaluations of 
whether they were meeting their three-year and ten-year child poverty 
goals, not only would there be no government incentive to reach those 
goals but also there would be no punishment for their failure to do so. 
119 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 115. 
120 Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The cavernous gap between a government’s promise and its success 
is accountability, which is guaranteed by ensuring both the 
dissemination of information to the public and the implementation of 
sanctions should the government fail at its tasks. New Zealand, a 
democratic country, recently put government accountability to the test 
by attempting to codify accountability within its ambitious Child 
Poverty Reduction Act. With a year to go before the self-proclaimed 
three-year targets to alleviate child poverty fall due, the government, 
led by the internationally renowned Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, 
looks certain to fail. 
Of course, the Prime Minister and her government should be 
commended for taking positive steps to reduce child poverty, 
particularly after decades of incriminating statistics showing New 
Zealand’s children were suffering in the grips of mass relative poverty. 
However, much like Ardern’s plan to create 100,000 affordable houses, 
her government once again over-promised and under-delivered. 
This Article has shown that when a government attempts to reduce 
poverty, the government’s actions must be implemented in a way that 
allows the government to be held accountable. Here, the New Zealand 
government chose to implement a piece of goal-setting legislation, 
which it heralded as a covenant of its accountability. As discussed in 
this Article, political accountability, although a cornerstone of good 
governance, is an elusive concept to define and enforce. This Article 
concludes that government accountability requires both the offer of 
information and the guarantee of sanctions if the government fails to 
deliver on its promise. New Zealand certainly provided an abundance 
of information on child poverty, yet there have been no sanctions for 
its failure to meet its own targets. Drawing on academic analyses in this 
area, this Article hypothesizes that instead of relying on vertical 
accountability as a means of checks and balances against its desired 
goals, the New Zealand government should have codified horizontal 
accountability into the Act and had its progress examined by an 
independent commission or ombudsman. While New Zealand’s 
government cannot emulate Brazil’s Bolsa Família program, as a new 
decade starts in New Zealand with child poverty rates as high as they 
have ever been, the government should heed the lesson of Bolsa 
Família regarding horizontal accountability. New Zealand should 
properly consider how it will deliver on its promises in the future and 
save its children. 
